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ABSTRACT 
 
GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE MATTERS: TURKEY AND ISRAEL  
Eliş, Berivan  
M.A., Department of International Relations 
Supervisor: Asst. Dr. Pınar Bilgin 
 
September 2004 
 
 
 In this thesis it is argued that geopolitical discourse matters in shaping the 
practices of foreign policy. The perspective of Critical Geopolitics approach is adopted as 
the theoretical framework and in conformity with this framework; this study focuses on 
the geopolitical discourse of the political elites. With reference to the geopolitical 
discourses of the political elites in Israel and Turkey, it is discussed that geopolitical 
discourse makes certain foreign policy options possible while marginalizing some others. 
Firstly, the main components of the geopolitical discourses in those countries, which are 
‘exceptionalism’, ‘Jewishness’, ‘security’ in Israel and ‘geographical determinism’ and ‘ 
Westernness/Europeanness’ in Turkey’, are identified. Then, the case of Oslo Peace 
Accords and the case of Turkey-EU relations are used in order to illustrate how different 
framings of these components matter in terms of foreign policy practices.  
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ÖZET 
 
JEOPOLİTİK SÖYLEM FARK YARATIR: İSRAİL VE TÜRKİYE 
 
Eliş, Berivan 
Master, Uluslararası İlişkiler Bölümü 
Tez Yöneticisi: Yar. Doç. Dr. Pınar Bilgin 
 
Eylül 2004 
 
  Bu tezde jeopolitik söylemin dış politika eylemlerini şekillendirmedeki fark 
yaratan rolü tartışılmıştır. Teorik çerçeve olarak Eleştirel Jeopolitik yaklaşımının 
perspektifi benimsenmiştir  ve bu teorik çerçeveye uygun olarak da siyasi elitin jeopolitik 
söylemi üzerine odaklanılmıştır. İsrail ve Türkiye’deki siyasi elitin jeopolitik söylemine 
atıflarda bulunularak jeopolitik söylemin bazı dış politika seçeneklerini marjinalize 
ederken bazı seçenekleri mümkün kıldığı tartışılmıştır. Önce bu ülkelerdeki jeopolitik 
söylemin ana bileşenleri—ki bunlar İsrail’de ‘diğerlerinden farklı olma 
(exceptionalism)’, ‘Yahudilik (Jewishness)’, ‘güvenlik (security)’ ve Türkiye’de 
‘coğrafyanın belirleyiciliği (geographical determinism)’ ve ‘Batılılık/Avrupalılık 
(Westernness/Europeanness)’tır— belirlenmiştir. Daha sonra da Oslo Barış Anlaşması ve 
Türkiye-AB ilişkileri örnekleri kullanılarak, bu bileşenlerin farklı şekillerde 
çerçevelenmesinin dış politika eylemleri açısından nasıl bir fark yarattığı  gösterilmeye 
çalışılmıştır.  
 
  
Anahtar Kelimeler: Eleştirel Jeopolitik, jeopolitik söylem, İsrail, Türkiye.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION  
 
 
The focus of this work will be how geopolitical discourse matters in shaping the 
practices of foreign policy. Foreign policy practices of governments make use of 
various geographical assumptions in order to “narrate geopolitical events and 
legitimize a particular course of action” (Allen, 2003: 102) while marginalizing 
alternative courses of action. Critical theorists consider language a means used to 
create and strengthen certain value systems.  The role language plays in shaping 
beliefs that affect people’s behaviors, motivations, desires, fears, and in establishing 
certain forms of knowledge as ‘common sense’ is viewed as crucial. Discourse is not 
seen merely as speeches and texts but also the contexts in which these ‘things’ are 
shaped (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 48). Geopolitical discourse can be defined as 
an implicit theory that shapes the practices of (especially foreign and security) 
policy-makers, academicians and writers.  
  
Geopolitical discourse is not simply about describing particular foreign 
policy situations. Geopolitical discourse enables/legitimizes certain foreign policy 
actions and marginalizes some others by establishing a representation. Geopolitical 
discourse, as any other discourse privileges certain forms of practice. It empowers 
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certain practices. Foucault (1980) argues that all discursive formations articulate 
power. Geopolitical discourse articulates power as well. The geopolitical discourse 
that is dominant at the time excludes other possible discourses from serious 
consideration. Once it becomes dominant, it appears unproblematic (Dalby, 1990: 
28). This is why “to expose power/knowledge relations embedded in geopolitical 
discourses is perhaps the single most important methodological objective of the 
critical geopolitical approach” (Hakli, 1998: 336). 
 
Critical examination of the workings of geopolitical discourse and the 
analysis of international politics as a set of discursive practices were initially 
developed by critical theorists of International Relations “who were inspired by 
poststructuralist interpretations of knowledge and its role in politics” (Ashley cited 
in Hakli, 1998: 334). Poststructuralist thinking does not see the ideas expressed by 
practicing politicians “as false accounts of a true reality. Rather they are seen as 
ideas which make certain things become real” (Painter, 1998: 146 cited in Hakli, 
1998: 335).  
  
These ideas have inspired some political geographers to establish a new 
approach, namely: Critical Geopolitics. Critical geopoliticians have explicitly 
adopted critical perspectives to develop a new approach to the study of geography. 
History has been the academic discipline concerned with ‘time’. Geography has 
been the academic discipline concerned with ‘space’. While history is quickly 
associated with complex theories, geography has remained largely unproblematic 
(Heffernan, 2000: 350). Thus, “[s]pace still continues to hold a geometric meaning, 
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evoking the idea of an empty area, waiting to be filled with meaningful objects” in 
our minds (Natter, 2000: 354).  
 
The term ‘geopolitics’ has been variously defined. John Agnew (1998: 4) 
defines geopolitics as “examination of the geographical assumptions, designations 
and understandings that enter into the making of world politics.” Simon Dalby 
(1990: 33) argues that the term geopolitics has many meanings often merging one 
into another but all have in common a general concern with the interrelationships of 
space and power. He also draws attention to the fact that although the relationships 
of space and power are central to the discussions of geopolitics, many of them are 
not spelt out in numerous geopolitical texts (Dalby, 1990: 33). Indeed, geopolitics is 
usually defined as the study of how geography affects politics. This affect of 
geography on politics is mostly understood as a deterministic relationship. 
Therefore, ‘geographical determinism’ has become the main premise of geopolitical 
discourse.  
 
Klaus Dodds (2001: 470-1) identifies four different tracks of research 
undertaken by Critical Geopolitics. The first one is concerned with geopolitical 
practices and tries to understand geographical and political reasoning and how they 
shape the practices of international politics. The second one is concerned with the 
geopolitical tradition. The third one deals with the relationships between geopolitics 
and popular culture. And the last one—named as structural geopolitics—is 
concerned with the linkage between the practices of statecraft and structural forces 
such as globalization and/or information networks. 
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The reason why the Critical Geopolitics approach is adopted in this thesis is 
because this approach allows the researcher to consider how claims about ‘scientific 
objectivity’ can obscure the role geographical knowledge plays in reproducing the 
world s/he lives in. Critical theorists ask, “how the philosophical presuppositions of 
the policy debates shape and limit what is possible to do and say within the 
established institutional patterns and structures of political discourse” (Dalby, 1990: 
4). This questioning leads them to search for alternatives.  
 
An important question to ask when studying discourse is which discourse or 
whose discourse to study. A significant number of geopoliticians argue that it should 
be the official discourse—discourse used by the state/government. Their argument is 
rooted in the idea that there would be no geopolitics at all were there no state. Denis 
Retaille (2000: 35) maintains that “[t]here is actually no geopolitics unless the state 
is involved either as an actor or as an aim, with the state having a significant 
geographical component through the institutionalization of territory”.  When coined 
by French philosopher Turgot in 1750, the term “political geography” corresponded 
to a branch of knowledge for the government (Agnew et al., 2003: 3). Yves Lacoste 
(1976) also sees geographical knowledge as essentially strategic and military in 
nature. For Neil Smith, “Geopolitics was and is a text for national leaders” (Smith, 
2000: 367). Peter Taylor maintains that political geography plays the role of a 
“creator of knowledge on relations between political power and geographical space” 
(Taylor, 2003: 50).  
 
 Critical geopoliticians (Dalby, 1990, 1991; Dodds and Sidaway, 1994; O 
Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998) have also argued that the primarily ‘dominant 
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discourse’ should be studied. What they refer to, as ‘the dominant’ is the official 
discourse. As Hakli (1998: 337) argues, “official discourses may well dominate, 
even colonize the popular ones”. Agnew (1998: 6) defines state discourse as a 
powerful and well-established conventional wisdom. Official/state discourses enjoy 
more “societal weight” than others (Hakli, 1998: 340). Hakli (1998: 340) explains 
this relation between power and knowledge as follows:  
[r]epresentations’ capability to manifest truth derives from their institutional 
weight rather than correspondence with the “external reality”. Thus 
governmentally produced representations have more authority than those 
produced within non-institutional settings—a basic tenet in a Foucauldian 
understanding of discourse.   
 
Official discourses are mainly produced within the state bureaucracy by state 
officials. When examining the case of the United States of America, Weldes and 
Saco (1996) explain why state officials have the power to produce the official 
discourse. They maintain that state officials are authorized to speak for ‘the United 
States’ meaning that “they are formally charged with defining the threats facing ‘the 
United States’, deciding on the actions to be taken by ‘the United States’, and 
implementing the policies of ‘the United States’” (Weldes and Saco, 1996: 377). 
 
Official discourses may be produced outside the government by different 
institutions such as the academia (Hakli, 1998: 344). These actors are labeled as 
‘intellectuals of statecraft’ by Critical geopoliticians. The term ‘intellectuals of 
statecraft’ refers to those who assist state officials in decision-making because of the 
‘expertise’ they have, such as academicians, retired bureaucrats, researchers (Weldes 
et al., 1999: 18; O Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 9). Intellectuals of statecraft can be less 
or more influential than state officials but what matters here is that both groups are 
privileged in articulating their ideas on foreign policy (Weldes et al., 1999: 18; O 
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Tuathail and Dalby, 1998: 9) and have the authority to mobilize geographical 
understanding “in such a way that its ‘obviousness’ is there for all to see” (Allen, 
2003: 102).   
 
In the attempt to show how geopolitical discourse matters in shaping 
practices of foreign policy, the thesis will focus on the discourses of state officials 
and ‘intellectuals of statecraft’ in Israel and Turkey. Agnew and Corbridge (1995: 
48) describe ‘political elites’ as the “whole community of government officials, 
political leaders, foreign-policy experts, and advisors … who conduct, influence and 
comment upon the activities of ‘statecraft’”. Throughout the thesis the term ‘political 
elites’ will be used to cover both the state officials and the ‘intellectuals of 
statecraft’.  
 
This study is composed of five chapters. Chapter II sets up an overall 
perspective for the rest of the study by bringing forward the main arguments of 
Critical Geopolitics and the study of geopolitical discourse. It is divided into two 
subsections. The first section deals with the arguments developed by the Critical 
Geopolitics approach. The second section focuses on the history of geopolitical 
thought in the West. This historical account is based on a key assumption built by 
the Critical geopoliticians. This section does not merely present a history of ideas 
but the aim is to show how the dominant geopolitical imaginations of the European-
American experience were incorporated in the field of political geography and these 
imaginations were “projected onto the rest of the world and into the future” (Agnew, 
1998: 1).  
Modern world politics has been structured by practices based on a set of 
understandings about “the way the world works” that together constitute the 
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elements of the modern geopolitical imagination. It is Eurocentric because 
Europe and its offshoots (such as Russia and the United States) came to 
dominate the world. Political elites around the world adjusted to and adapted 
understandings and practices emanating from Europe. […] From Brasilia to 
Seoul and from Cairo to Beijing the dominant model is still that invented 
originally in Europe (Agnew, 1998: 6). 
 
Critical scholars point to the domination of the Western thought in the field of 
geopolitics. Therefore, the history of the Western geopolitical thought emerges as an 
important subject to study in order to understand the roots of the geopolitical 
discourses elsewhere around the world. This critical account of the development of 
geopolitical discourse in the West will also be used as a stepping-stone for the next 
two chapters where geopolitical thought in Israel and Turkey will be studied by 
looking at the discourses of political elites in these countries.  
 
Chapter III presents an illustration of the argument that ‘discourse matters’ 
by looking at how geopolitical discourse matters in Israel. ‘Exceptionalism’, 
‘Jewishness’ and ‘security’ are identified as the main components of the Israeli 
geopolitical discourse. These components were mostly used in order to explain why 
peace was an ‘impossible’ choice for Israel until the realization of the Oslo Peace 
Accords in 1993. The example of Oslo Accords will be used to demonstrate how 
these same components were framed in a different way making peace a foreign 
policy option.  
 
Chapter IV presents an illustration of the same argument by looking at 
Turkey’s case. ‘Geographical determinism’ and ‘Westernness’ are the main 
components of Turkish geopolitical discourse. The example of Turkey-EU relations 
will be used to illustrate how different framing of these components presents 
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Turkey’s geographical location in different ways as providing a ground for different 
arguments about the EU.  
 
In the web pages of their Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both Israel and Turkey 
are designated as lying at the crossroads of three continents, Asia, Africa and Europe 
and therefore as having an exceptional geopolitical location.1 Yet, this designation is 
unwarranted because there are other countries with similar geopolitical locations—
such as Syria. Moreover, there are countries with dissimilar geopolitical locations 
but with similar claims to exceptionalism in their geopolitical discourse—such as 
Spain (Sidaway, 2000: 121). There are a number of studies in the literature on Israel 
from a Critical geopolitics perspective (see Barnett, 1996, 1999, 2002; Newman 
2002a, 2002b; Valerie, 2002; Yiftachel 2002). Chapter III will mainly use the 
arguments developed by David Newman (2002a, 2002b) and Michael Barnett (1996, 
1999, 2002) because their approach to the subject has been widely adopted by other 
Critical scholars studying Israeli geopolitics. Unlike the Israeli case, the Turkish 
case is studied by a few (Belge, 1993; Bilgin, 2003, 2004a, 2004b). This has led me 
to make use of primary sources mostly. Since, there are a few sources to rely on 
about the Turkish case, I found it useful to use the academic work on Israeli 
geopolitical discourse in order to set a basis for analyzing the Turkish case.  
 
Saying that geopolitical discourse matters does not mean that no other factors 
matter. Geopolitical phenomena are both material and discursive (Hakli, 1998: 334; 
Weldes and Saco, 1996: 395). Geographical knowledge embedded in the material 
practices of government; global economy, development and war-making shape 
                                                 
1 See  <www.mfa.gov.il>  for Israel and <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm> for Turkey.  
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geopolitical phenomena and, in turn, are shaped by them (O Tuathail and Agnew, 
1992 cited in Hakli, 1998: 334). A critical geopolitical analysis of geopolitical 
phenomena seeks to expose the “politics of the geographical specification of 
politics” (Dalby, 1991: 274 cited in Hakli, 1998: 334). This, in turn, “involves 
reflexivity with regard to the dominant texts produced by intellectuals and 
practitioners of statecraft, but also with regard to the material contexts within which 
the dominant discourses have historically emerged” (Hakli, 1998: 334).  
 
Give the limits of time, it was not possible to study the relationship between 
material factors and geopolitical discourse in this thesis. There is a need for 
extensive studies about different/competing geopolitical imaginations/ 
representations, and competing identities of Turkey and their relation to processes of 
social and economic change. The concluding chapter will summarize the thesis and 
reflect upon the limits of my findings.  
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CHAPTER II 
CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
 
It is through [geopolitical] discourse that leaders act, through the 
mobilization of certain simple geographical understandings that foreign-
policy actions are explained and through ready-made geographically infused 
reasoning that wars are rendered meaningful (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1998: 
78).  
 
The main premise of Critical Geopolitics is described as “the contention that 
geography is a social and historical discourse which is always intimately bound 
up with question of politics and ideology” (Foucault cited in O Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1998: 79). Geopolitical discourses are power structures in themselves. 
They are constructed by particular institutions and political forces in order to 
maintain their power or gain more power in world politics (O Tuathail and 
Agnew, 1998: 79-80).  These discourses shape the minds not only of the 
geopoliticians but also of academicians, students, writers and common people and 
serve as justifications for some foreign policy actions. They also serve to 
represent and, when necessary, reconstruct the meaning of the past, present and 
future (O Tuathail, 2000:126). This reconstruction allows people to specify 
geographies/spaces in particular ways, which enable policy-makers to act in 
specific modes with certain political consequences (Dalby, 1990: i).     
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   Geographical definitions and concepts are important component parts of 
states’ strategic doctrines, policy-making processes and academic discussions of 
world affairs. These definitions and conceptualizations enable certain foreign 
policy actions while marginalizing alternative courses of action. For example, 
conventional geographical categorization names different areas as ‘advanced’ or 
‘primitive’, ‘modern’ or ‘backward’, ‘democratic’ or ’undemocratic’. While 
“Europe and some of its political-cultural offspring (such as United States)” 
(Agnew, 1998: 8) are seen as representing modernity and democracy, “other parts 
of the world only figure in terms of how they appear relative to Europe’s past” 
(Agnew, 1998: 8). Defining Europe and America as ‘modern’, and the rest of the 
world as ‘backward’ make political intervention into other parts of the world 
possible while marginalizing alternative courses of action. Describing an area as 
‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic” is not only describing it, but also describing “the 
type of foreign policy its ‘nature’ demands” (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995:48; 
also see O Tuathail, 2000). Irrespective of whether its purveyors are 
academicians, practitioners of statecraft or media persons, defining areas as 
‘developed’ or ‘developing’, ‘Western’ or ‘Islamic’ is a geopolitical discourse 
(Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 49). Once this geopolitical discourse is constituted, 
it stamps itself to people’s minds to the extent that even challenges to it must 
conform to the terms of debate as laid down by the dominant discourse (Agnew 
and Corbridge, 1995: 49).   
 
State action is legitimized by making use of ‘geopolitics’; this is why the 
role of geopolitical discourse as a useful tool emerges. Nicholas Spkyman, one of 
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the key figures of traditional geopolitical thought, wrote that “[g]eography does 
not argue. It just is.” Following Simon Dalby (1990: 14), “states are understood 
here as politically created practices and their claims to legitimacy ought to be the 
subject of critical investigation rather than the point of departure for analysis.” 
Gearoid O Tuathail (1996:21) argues that geopolitics is simply about politics, and 
matters of politics and discourse intersect. Thus, studying discourse might 
contribute a lot to a critical reevaluation of political theories and practices 
(Milliken, 1999:225-29). 
 
 
2.2 Critical Geopolitics  
 
Critical Geopolitics emerged as an alternative approach to mainstream 
geopolitical thinking. Critical Geopolitics scholars maintain that “geopolitics is 
not a discrete and relatively contained activity confined only to a small group of 
‘wise men’ that speak in the language of classical geopolitics” (O Tuathail: 1996, 
60). Geopolitics is about politics.  
 
  Critical Geopolitics studies seek to reveal the power/knowledge relations 
in both the study and practices of geopolitics. The institutional power and 
disciplinary power/knowledge apparatuses centered in the United States 
overwhelmingly shape the rules governing world order (O Tuathail, Dalby and 
Routledge, 1998: 5-10). Critical Geopolitics identifies the structure of the 
production of geopolitical knowledge. Experts, institutions and ideology create 
the ‘necessary’ geographical knowledge and present it to policy-makers in an 
‘advice to the prince’ manner (O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 8). The 
term ‘geopolitics’ seems to hold an objective rather than subjective (or 
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ideological), and visual rather than verbal meaning (O Tuathail, Dalby and 
Routledge, 1998). Yet, Critical Geopolitics argues that this is not the case. 
Associated with national security, geopolitics becomes a way to justify the 
exercise of power (O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 3-4).  
 
  Critical Geopolitics does not only seek to uncover the power play but also 
engages itself with understanding how it might be possible to imagine different 
geopolitical arrangements. Critical geopoliticians (O Tuathail: 1996, 1998; 
Agnew and Corbridge, 1995; Agnew, 1998; Dodds, 2000; Dalby, 1990, 1996) are 
aware of the language of geopolitics that is used in foreign policy making 
(Dijkink, 1996:5). Inspired by the works of figures such as Michel Foucault 
(1980) and Edward Said (1977), they identify discourse as a ‘matrix of 
reasoning’, an ‘ensemble of ideas and concepts’ or a “regime of truth that 
functions as a power/knowledge system, constituting, representing and 
interpreting the ‘real’” (O Tuathail, 2000:126).  
 
In The Geopolitics Reader, O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge present us 
with a collection of geopolitical texts that shaped the geopolitical thinking and 
foreign-policy decisions in the 20th century, such as Halford Mackinder’s “The 
Geographical Pivot of History” or George Kennan’s “The Sources of Soviet 
Conduct” or Samuel Huntington’s “The Clash of Civilizations”. What they seek 
to show is that geopolitical texts are not ‘neutral’ writings from some detached 
position outside politics, history or geography, but they are a part of political 
decision-making and the exercise of power by some actors. Reading these texts 
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shows how the political significance of particular geographies and even 
geographies themselves can change.  
Critical geopoliticians use critical discourse analysis as a method to 
research on the subject. Critical discourse analysis can be described as a way of 
thinking about a problem rather than providing a method to the researcher. 
Discourse analysis is not a research method in this respect but a way of 
questioning the ontological and epistemological assumptions behind a statement. 
Discourse analysis enables the researcher to interpret texts and contexts; it 
enables the researcher to reveal the implicit assumptions behind them and behind 
a choice of a particular option for action. Critical discourse analysis is the 
application of critical thought to life and the unveiling of ‘the dominant’ through 
an interpretative reading. Most Critical geopoliticians draw upon Foucault’s 
work, 
In Foucault’s terms discourses are much more than linguistic 
performances, they are also plays of power which mobilize rules, codes 
and procedures to assert a particular understanding through the 
construction of knowledge within these rules, codes and procedures. 
Because they organize reality in specific ways through understanding and 
knowing in ways that involve particular epistemological claims, they 
provide legitimacy, and provide the intellectual conditions of possibility 
of particular institutional and political arrangements (Dalby, 1990:5).  
 
The acquisition of power and the enforcement of political beliefs can be achieved 
in a number of ways. Physical coercion/imposition is one way. Other kinds of 
coercion can be implemented by different political regimes through their legal 
systems. Another effective way may be to persuade the people to act voluntarily 
in the way you want; that is, to exercise power through the construction of 
consent or agreement (Thomas and Wareing, 1999: 34; Dalby, 1990: 8). Using 
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the ‘right’ language can make certain ideas or options appear as ‘common sense’, 
which, in turn, makes it difficult to question them.  
 
Political discourse relies on the principle that people’s perception of 
politics is influenced by language. Language shelters implicit assumptions that 
cannot be found in what is actually said. This feature of language affect people in 
a way that they take something for granted which is actually open to debate 
(Thomas and Wareing, 1999: 35). Writers such as Foucault, Said, and Derrida 
investigated this feature of language and wrote about “how discourses operate to 
foreclose political possibilities and eliminate from consideration a multiplicity of 
possible worlds” (Dalby, 1990: 5-6).  
2.3 The Foundations of Traditional Geopolitics 
During the twentieth century, when geopolitics was born and flourished, it was a 
sort of ‘specialized discourse’. It was a scientific and technical field and its 
‘political’ aspect was cast aside. Today mainstream geopoliticians follow the 
same tradition when they try to invoke technical expertise in order to provide a 
scientific source of information for policy makers. This ‘expert discourse’ they 
use renders political discussion about the subject unnecessary (Dalby, 1990:11). 
However, as Foucault writes, “territory is no doubt a geographical notion, 
but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of 
power” (Foucault, 1980: 68). Mainstream geopolitics dehistoricizes 
geography/territory by reducing it to a ‘fact’. Yet, as Said argues, geographies are 
‘man-made’ (cited in Dalby, 1990: 25). They are historic creations and they could 
have been otherwise. Here, what is meant by ‘geography’ is the kind of 
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geography mainstream geopolitics deals with. Mainstream geopolitics does not 
deal with mountains, rivers or plateaus as natural formations but it looks into why 
and how those mountains and rivers could be used for some political ends. It is 
concerned with the relations of space and power. It is concerned with boundaries 
and control. Boundaries are not ‘natural’ in the way that mountains or rivers are 
natural. They are not ‘natural’ formations. Throughout history people formed 
them; they are ‘man-made.’ Geography does not act; it is people who act in the 
name of geographies. Thus, we can ask: “How would a geography that is not 
political act?” (Natter, 2000: 357).  
Thinking about matters in this way requires a reconceptualization of the 
history of geopolitics, which means that a historical study focusing on geopolitical 
discursive practices should be made (Dalby, 1990: 14). John Agnew makes a critical 
contribution in this respect. Agnew (1995, 1998) argues that geopolitical discourses 
provide “the rhetorical understandings and dominant meanings through which 
geopolitical order have been realized in foreign and economic policies” (Agnew and 
Corbridge, 1995: 76). He identifies three different geopolitical orders: civilisational, 
naturalized and ideological geopolitics, which followed each other chronologically; 
each stemming from the remnants of the previous one (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 
46-77; Agnew, 1998: 86-127). ‘Civilisational geopolitics’ (Agnew and Corbridge, 
1995: 52-56; Agnew, 1998: 87-94) refers to the Eurocentric understanding of the 
world as defined by the Europeans themselves. Although Russia and the United 
States also contributed to this understanding, the main premise of civilisational 
geopolitics was that ‘Europe’ was seen as a unique civilization with a unique history. 
This assumption of uniqueness provided Europe with a general ordering principle—
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which is civilization—and formed a strong European identity. Agnew considers the 
peak of civilisational geopolitics as the first half of the nineteenth century.  
The following geopolitical order was ‘naturalized geopolitics’. This new 
understanding of geography was the basis of geopolitical knowledge between 
1875 and 1945, Agnew argues. In naturalized geopolitics states were seen as 
‘natural’ entities (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 56-65; Agnew, 1998: 94-105). 
They are see as living organisms that have natural boundaries (mountains or 
rivers form natural boundaries for states). According to this understanding, once 
born like other living organisms, states will ‘naturally’ grow. The idea of state as 
a living organism was a reflection of the Darwinist theory about the survival of 
the fittest. According to this Darwinist interpretation of geopolitics, powerful 
states have a ‘natural’ right to extend their power at the expense of others in order 
to survive. Relatively weak states would be eliminated and stronger ones will go 
on their struggles for ‘healthy’ development. A clear articulation of this 
understanding can be seen in Nazi geopolitics. Nazi geopolitics was organized 
around the doctrine of Lebensraum (living space). According to that doctrine, it 
was Germany’s ‘natural’ right to expand its territories at the expense of other 
states because Germany needed more territory for its healthy development.  
The last type of geopolitical order identified by Agnew is ‘ideological 
geopolitics’ (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 65-76; Agnew, 1998: 105-119). After 
the Second World War, the world was divided into three (both geographically and 
ideologically): the East, the West and the Third World. The principal 
characteristic of ideological geopolitics was that there was a central ideological 
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and systemic conflict over territory. The USSR and the USA were rivals in 
extending their influence over other areas of the world.  
Agnew’s analysis is a valuable contribution in historicizing and 
contextualizing geopolitical discourse. Agnew (1998: 86-7) explains that his 
study of the past geopolitical orders reveals the continuities in geopolitical 
thought throughout history as well. He maintains that, by examining the evolution 
of geopolitical orders one can unveil the affects of the past on today’s geopolitical 
imagination (Agnew, 1998: 86).  In this respect, he points to state-centricity and 
geographical determinism as the key elements of today’s geopolitical imagination 
inherited from the past (Agnew, 1998: 86, 127). Another key element of today’s 
geopolitical imagination he identifies is the claim to ‘view from nowhere’; that is, 
the scientific claim to objectivity (Agnew, 1998: 8). A closer look to the main 
approaches to traditional geopolitics will demonstrate that these elements are also 
central to the dominant geopolitical discourse today. 
2.4 Traditional Geopolitics 
Traditional geopolitical thought summarized in this section represents a tradition of 
designating geography as tool of statecraft. Traditional theories share the assumption 
that geography plays a determining role on a country’s well-being and security. This 
assumption is formulated as a ‘scientific fact’ by these traditional theories, and is not 
opened to debate. 
 
The late nineteenth century and early twentieth century geopolitical theories 
considered expansionism as a necessary means for maintaining security. It was 
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within this imperialist context that geopolitics first emerged as a concept and 
practice (O Tuathail, 1998: 4). Before the term ‘geopolitics’ was coined, there were 
intellectuals writing about the importance of geography over political strategy. For 
example, American naval historian Alfred Mahan published his work The Influence 
of Seapower upon History in 1890.  It was Rudolf Kjellen who coined the term 
‘geopolitics’ in 1899 for the first time. He was a Swedish political scientist who was 
trying to make political geography more ‘scientific’ (in the positivist sense of the 
term). He adopted Friedrich Ratzel’s Darwinist idea of the state as ‘a living 
organism’ and sought to analyze the state in all its dimensions, terming ‘geopolitics’ 
as one dimension of state activity. His ideas on geopolitics, including the term itself, 
strongly influenced German geopolitics, the thinking of Karl Haushofer in particular 
(O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 4-5). 
 
Friedrich Ratzel, whose ideas influenced twentieth century geopolitics, was 
an important figure for the development of political geography in the nineteenth 
century. For Ratzel, states (nation-states) were living organisms and were subject to 
the same rules as other living organisms. Like all organisms, nations required land 
and space for survival. It was Ratzel who first coined the term lebensraum (living 
space) in 1897 (O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 4). 
 
Halford Mackinder, another important figure in political geography, in his 
article, “The Geographical Pivot of History” published in 1904, put forward his 
famous “heartland theory”. For Mackinder, heartland is the pivotal area that has 
fundamental strategic and historical significance. The heartland he was talking about 
was located in the European areas of Russia including Central Asia. He argued that 
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if the people and resources were properly organized with efficient government and 
fully developed industrialization, the heartland was geographically situated to 
dominate the entire ‘world island’, the entire Eurasia, the whole region from 
Western Europe to the Pacific, and then the entire world (O Tuathail, Dalby and 
Routledge, 1998: 17-18). According to Mackinder, Russia, given its geographical 
location, would likely dominate the world. Many geopoliticians have adopted his 
mapping of the world—the emphasis on the geopolitical power of Russia and the 
land on which Russia was situated—during the Cold War.  
 
Mackinder’s ideas affected the school of German militarist geographers such 
as Karl Haushofer (O Tuathail, 1998: 18). Haushofer had served as a general in the 
German army during the First World War but moved into academic life after the 
war. His geopolitical theory brought together the ideas of Ratzel, Kjellen and 
Mackinder. He thought that a major reason for Germany’s defeat in the First World 
War was a lack of geographical knowledge and geopolitical awareness. Haushofer’s 
studies that came out in the 1930s and during the Second World War provided many 
geopolitical ideas for the Nazis, which, in turn, reduced the credibility of 
‘geopolitics’ in the aftermath of the Second World War (O Tuathail, 1998: 20-21). 
However, contrary to Nazis’ racist approach, Haushofer’s geopolitics prioritized 
‘space’ over ‘race’ (O Tuathail, 1998: 23). Following Mackinder’s heartland theory, 
Haushofer argued that Germany’s best course was to ally herself, or at least not to 
become enemies, with Russia (the heartland power). He thought that Germany had 
lost the First World War because its leaders did not study geopolitics and distanced 
Germany from Russia (O Tuathail, 1998: 20). If they had studied geopolitics, argued 
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Haushofer, they would have known that being in conflict with the heartland power 
was wrong strategically.  
  
Another traditional geopolitician who applied Mackinder’s thoughts to his 
geopolitical work is Nicholas Spykman. Contrary to Mackinder, he argued that the 
‘rimland’, the land surrounding the heartland, was of central importance for 
controlling the ‘world island’. For Spykman, the state controlling the rimland can 
control Eurasia, and control the fate of the world (Tarakçı, 2003: 82).  
 
 One can find the key components of today’s geopolitical imagination such as 
state-centricism and geographical determinism in these traditional studies on 
geopolitics. These studies all share the assumption that geography has a determining 
role on history and politics. No matter where they place the heartland or the rimland, 
these traditional studies are implicated in imperialist policies as they present 
territorial expansion as necessary for the well being of aspiring powers.  
 
2.4.1 Cold War Geopolitics 
 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, the content of German Geopolitik, based 
primarily on Haushofer’s ideas, was considered as the central component of Nazi 
ideology. This resulted in the rejection of geopolitical theory after the War (Starr, 
1992: 2). During the Cold War, geopolitical analysis meant geostrategic analysis in 
order to fight the ‘war’ more effectively (Parker, 1997: 43). Geopolitics continued to 
exist under different labels during this period. Both superpowers waged ‘hot’ wars in 
different areas of the world using geopolitical justifications. For example, the 
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Vietnam War was started by the USA in order to stop perceived Soviet territorial 
and ideological expansionism (O Tuathail, 1998: 53). Geopolitics became a way of 
defining the world according to the strategic priorities of the superpowers. Terms 
such as ‘geopolitics’ or ‘geopolitical’ were rarely pronounced but the order 
established was mainly geopolitical. The determining role of geography over a 
state’s fate was still central to geopolitical thought.  
George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’ (1946) from Moscow, also known as the 
‘X Article’ (published in Foreign Affairs) is of crucial importance to understand the 
geopolitical reasoning of the Cold War from US perspective. Kennan presented two 
important arguments. First, he said that the Soviet state was historically and 
inherently expansionist and thus a firm policy of containment was needed. Second, 
Soviet communists were ‘fanatics’ and there was no way for diplomacy and 
negotiation with them (O Tuathail, 1998: 49-50). 
The Truman Doctrine (1947) was a speech delivered to the US Congress by 
the President Truman to convince the Americans about the necessity of financial aid 
to the Greeks fighting against the left-wing forces in Greece. This was another 
important component of Cold War geopolitical thought. In his speech Truman 
divided the world into two: totalitarianism and freedom. “It must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or by outside pressures” he said (cited in O Tuathail, 1998: 48-9). 
Truman did not set any geographical limits for US foreign policy because the 
totalitarian threat against the freedom was perceived to be unlimited (O Tuathail, 
1998: 50). 
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It is claimed that Mackinder’s thesis was a major influence in American 
geopolitical thought (O Tuathail, 1998: 47-56; Retaille, 2000: 42). It is argued that 
his theory helped to provide the basis for the theory of containment because 
Mackinder was also talking about forming a ring around the periphery of the ‘world 
island’. This ring was needed in order to prevent the power of the heartland from 
dominating the world. It was in this context that the ‘domino theory’ became such 
prominent. Dean Acheson, Secretary of State in the Truman administration, 
formulated a theory in which he designated the Southeast Asian countries as a row 
of dominoes that can fall to the side of communism one by one (O Tuathail, 1998: 
52). 
These arguments that were developed by US officials soon provoked the 
reaction of the USSR. A Soviet ‘intellectual of the statecraft’ Andrei Zhdanov best 
explained the Soviet perspective on the Cold War in 1947. He divided the world into 
two camps, an ‘imperialist and anti-democratic camp’ led by the USA and its allies 
at one side and an ‘anti-imperialist and democratic camp’ led by the Soviet Union 
and the ‘new democracies’ in Eastern Europe (O Tuathail, 1998: 50). These new 
democracies were in fact Soviet controlled regimes that could not take part in the 
Marshall Plan (O Tuathail, 1998: 50).  
 
The Brezhnev Doctrine of 1968, which was published as an article in the 
official Soviet Communist newspaper by Politbureau leader, Leonid Brezhnev, in 
order to justify the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, is another very important 
component of the geopolitical reasoning of the Cold War years. Brezhnev stated that 
the countries in Eastern Europe must not damage socialism in their country or the 
fundamental interests of the other socialist countries or the worldwide communist 
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movement. If a country is doing so then it is serving to the world imperialism and 
imperialism could not be accepted (O Tuathail, 1998: 52-3).  
 
These ideas played important roles in the construction of Cold War 
geopolitical discourses. These theories made possible the American involvement in 
civil wars in Vietnam and Korea, which are thousands of miles away from the 
United States (O Tuathail, 1998: 52). At the same time, they legitimized the 
representation of ‘Great Powers’ as the main actors that can influence the course of 
world politics (Agnew, 1998: 86).  
 
2.4.2 Post-Cold War Geopolitics 
 
The end of the Cold War led to uncertainty and unpredictability. Western 
intellectuals tried to develop new arguments to explain the dynamics of the new 
system. Fukuyama declared the ‘end of history’. According to Fukuyama, the post-
Cold War era would witness a transformation of regions such as Eastern Europe 
from state-managed communism to liberal democracy and market economics. 
Geography or territorial hegemony was not important for him, it was the global 
hegemony of liberal democracy and market economics that was important and the 
Cold War ended with their victory (O Tuathail, 1998: 104). Samuel Huntington in 
his “Clash of Civilizations” article argued that the new global order would be 
characterized by the interaction of large civilizations (O Tuathail, 1998: 110-1). 
Unlike Fukuyama, he did not consider the West as politically and culturally 
dominant but claimed that the new world order would witness the growing influence 
of Islamic, East Asian and Chinese civilizations (Dodds, 2000: 12). Both arguments 
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about the end of the Cold War are geopolitical in the sense that they shared a 
concern with the mapping of global political space (Dodds, 2002: 15).  
 
The Gulf War constitutes a good example for understanding the discourse of 
Post-Cold War geopolitics. How USA did justify its intervention in a dispute 
between Iraq and Kuwait? The ideological justifications of the Cold War era were 
no longer meaningful during this period given changes in Soviet (later Russian) 
policy. US policy-makers overcame this problem by defining a ‘new world order’ (O 
Tuathail, 1998: 109). In this new world order, there were serious threats to 
America’s interests, which were ‘rogue states’ representing uncontrolled violence. 
US interests were presented as the universal interests of the mankind, so America 
had to fight for the good of all humankind. Cold-War style reasoning continued to 
dominate US strategic thought after the Cold War because America always 
constitutes its response to foreign crises on perceiving threat from any “evil” 
otherness (cited in O Tuathail, 1998: 108-9). The new evil others were 
rogue/torn/failed states.   
 
2.5 Conclusion 
From a critical perspective, “the study of geopolitics is the study of spatialization of 
international politics by core powers and hegemonic states” (O Tuathail and Agnew, 
1998: 80). The tradition of geopolitical thinking presented above helps us “to outline 
a re-conceptualization of geopolitics in terms of discourse” (O Tuathail and Agnew, 
1998: 78). Twentieth century geopolitical thinking continues to provide a ‘tool-box’ 
for the conduct of foreign policies of states. It was through the geopolitical discourse 
rooted in this tradition of geopolitical thought that many foreign policy actions of 
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states became possible and/or justified. This tradition of thought represents 
international politics “as a ‘world’ characterized by particular types of places, 
peoples and dramas” (O Tuathail and Agnew, 1998: 82). It considers geopolitics as 
the base of international politics around which the play of events unfolds (O Tuathail 
and Agnew, 1998: 79). 
As discussed in Chapter I, geopolitical ideas produced in Europe and 
America has formed the backbone of geopolitical thinking because they have been 
reflected on the rest of the world (Agnew, 1998: 1). The following two chapters on 
Israel and Turkey, besides illustrating how geopolitical discourse matters, will also 
show how the main assumptions of European and American traditional geopolitical 
thought, namely geographical determinism, have also been adopted by the Israeli 
and Turkish political elites.  
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CHAPTER III 
HOW GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE MATTERS IN ISRAEL 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
On 14 May 1948, Israel proclaimed its independence. Less than 24 hours 
later, the regular armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq invaded 
the country, forcing Israel to defend the sovereignty it had regained in its 
ancestral homeland.2 
 
Since its foundation in 1948 until today, Israel got involved in several wars, conflicts 
and territorial disputes with its neighbors. The War of Independence in 1948 was 
followed by the 1956 Sinai Campaign, 1967 Six Days War, 1968-70 War of 
Attrition, 1973 Yom Kippur War, 1982 Lebanon War and the Israeli occupation of 
southern Lebanon, and Iraq’s missile attack during the 1991 Gulf War. Issues of war 
and peace have always been central to Israeli politics. Dan Horowitz (1982: 11) 
explains this as follows: In the absence of peace with its Arab neighbors, Israel faces 
the military challenge for survival; during times of peace with its Arab neighbors 
Israel is in a perpetual state of ‘dormant war’.  
                                                 
2 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs. “The State of Israel”. 
<http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/history/history%20of%20israel/HISTORY-
%20The%20State%20of%20Israel > accessed on 09.06.2004. Emphasis added. 
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 Territorial issues have been in the focus of Israeli politics in relation to the 
dynamics of Israel’s experiences of war and peace (Yiftachel, 2002). Israel 
expanded its territories after the Six Day War in 1967; it later withdrew from some 
of these territories after the Israel-Egypt peace agreement in 1978. The next 
territorial expansion was Israel’s occupation of Southern Lebanon in 1982, from 
which it withdrew after 18 years in 2000. The Oslo Peace Accords also resulted in 
transfer of some territory to the Palestinian Authority. If attempts to reach a peace 
settlement can be realized, that would bring further territorial change (Newman, 
2002: 634-635).  
  
Since issues such as war, peace and territory are at the center of Israeli 
politics, ‘geopolitics’ has been an important field of study in Israel. Israeli 
geopolitical discourse has various components; this chapter will focus on three of 
them: ‘exceptionalism’, ‘Jewishness’ and ‘security’. All three are interrelated: 
‘Jewishness’ is also a basis for the sense of ‘exceptionalism’3, and ‘security’ takes its 
departure point from both ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘Jewishness’. 
 
“A discursive account highlights relations of constitution by exposing the 
way in which a particular discourse both constrains and enables the production of 
particular understandings” (Weldes and Saco, 1996: 373) of war, of peace, of 
territory and of the relations between them. This is not to suggest that material or 
non-linguistic conditions do not matter. They do; but looking at these discursive 
                                                 
3 Jewishness can be taken as a source for every kind of discourse  in Israel.  
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practices one sees that linguistic practices also matter. “[S]tate action is, at least in 
part, a discursive, and thus also a linguistic artifact” (Weldes and Saco, 1996: 395). 
 
Geopolitical maneuverings of state elites are crucial in making different 
courses of action possible. Geopolitical positioning of states can change because this 
positioning is tied to the “internal discourse of identity of that country’s citizens” 
(Newman, 2002b: 303). Political elites shape the country’s definition of national 
interest (Newman, 2002b: 303). This, in turn, is done through elites’ manipulation of 
representations of Israel’s geopolitical position. According to Newman, Israel is “an 
interesting case study whose geopolitical positioning is diverse and has undergone 
change over time” (Newman, 2002b: 304). 
 
In this chapter, first these three interrelated elements of Israel’s geopolitical 
discourse will be outlined. Next to illustrate how geopolitical discourse matters in 
foreign policy practices, the case of Oslo Peace Accords (1993) will be examined. 
For decades, a peace agreement with the Palestinians was considered impossible 
because of the ongoing violence and territorial disputes between the two peoples. 
Yet, the leaders of both sides agreed to make a peace accord in 1993. It is argued 
that what made peace possible for Israel was the reframing of the components of 
geopolitical discourse in a way that allowed for peace and territorial change. Israel’s 
framing of its geopolitics was also changed later with the failure of Oslo accords to 
reach a conclusion. 
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3.2 Exceptionalism: Israel as an Exceptional State 
In the dominant discourse, Jewish peoples’ religion, history and culture are 
presented in a way that makes Israel an exceptional state. This exceptionalism refers 
to positive aspects, such as being ‘chosen’ and negative aspects, such as being under 
‘existential threat’. As Newman (2002b: 309) maintains “geopolitical discourse in 
Israel has almost always evolved around notions of security and collective safety 
focusing on the existential threat, real or perceived, facing Israel from hostile 
neighbors”. Whether Israel is ‘really’ exceptional or not will not be discussed here. 
What is important for the purpose of this thesis is that its political elites represent 
Israel as an exceptional country and this representation of Israel forms a pillar of the 
dominant geopolitical discourse in Israel. Representations of Israel as an exceptional 
country facing exceptional threats make possible certain security and foreign 
policies while marginalizing other options. 
 
As noted above, the dominant discourse presents Israel as an exceptional 
country, which is under constant existential threat (Barnett, 1996; Merom, 1999; 
Murden, 2000; Newman, 2002). Exceptionalism refers to Israel’s unique 
characteristics, which are also its vulnerabilities. Consider the words of Former 
Defense Minister of Israel:  
The establishment of Israel was a modern miracle; an exceptional event in 
human history. Her survival, while constantly struggling against Arab 
aggression and terror in the hostile environment of the Middle East, seemed 
to me no less miraculous. Surely, there is no parallel in history for such 
casualties, courage and energy of a small people that faces such 
overwhelming threats (cited in Merom, 1999: 410). 
 
Members of social groups build their collective identity on two kinds of perceptions: 
perceptions of shared characteristics within the group and the perceptions of the 
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difference between these characteristics and those of other groups. Images of 
identity and difference tie individuals into an imagined social whole and create a 
sense of exceptionalism (Merom, 1999: 409). A significant part of Israeli society—
namely religious Jews and supporters of Zionism—present Israel as a unique state 
and leaders seem convinced that the Jewish people, their historical experiences and 
the security problems they face are exceptional (Dror, 1996: 247; Kook, 1996: 199-
225; Merom, 1999: 410; Newman, 2000: 319-27). Merom (1999: 410) links this 
Israeli sense of exceptionalism to its cultural and historical background. Biblical 
notions, diaspora life, early national calamities, anti-Semitism, and the Holocaust are 
the components of this cultural and historical background (Merom, 1999: 412-3).  
 
Cultural foundations of this exceptionalism stemming from Biblical 
narratives represent the Jewish people as ‘divinely’ chosen: God spoke to Abraham, 
“go forth from your native land and from your father’s house to the land that I will 
show you. I will make of you a great nation” (cited in Kamm, 1999: 7). Indications 
of these cultural foundations can be traced in the words of David Ben-Gurion, the 
first prime minister of Israel: “We do not fit the general path of humanity: Others 
say because we are flawed. I think because the general pattern is flawed, and we 
neither accept it nor adapt to it” (cited in Merom, 1999: 142). Similarly, in another 
speech he delivered he said:  
You […] know that we were always a small people, always surrounded by 
big nations with whom we engaged in a struggle; political as well as 
spiritual; that we created things that they did not accept; that we were 
exceptional […]. Our survival-secret during these thousands of years […] has 
one source: Our supreme quality, our intellectual and moral advantage, which 
singles us out even today, as it did throughout the generations (cited in 
Merom, 1999: 354).  
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This belief in being chosen and exceptional can also be found in the words of 
Yitzhak Rabin’s assassin: “Rabin had no right to relinquish any part of Jewish 
historical and God-given homeland. He is therefore a traitor who deserves death” 
(cited in Yiftachel, 2002: 238. emphasis added). 
 
An important consequence of Israeli exceptionalism for security and foreign 
policy making has been that Israeli actors have sought to confront the high and 
intense level of threats they face with complex military strategic solutions (Merom, 
1999: 416). The following words of Ben Gurion represent this line of thinking best: 
We [Israelis] will not solve [our security problems] by means of simple 
answers, drawn from our past or adopted from other people. Whatever 
[solution] was adequate in the past, and for others—will not be adequate for 
us, since our security problem is one of a kind… We will not withstand the 
[trying hour] unless we perceive our situation and needs in their geographic 
and historical singularity, and construct a security method adequate for that 
uniqueness” (cited in Merom, 1999: 416-17).  
  
Ariel Sharon also shares the assumption of uniqueness of Israel’s security problems 
and the need for unique solutions to these problems: “Israel faces unconventional 
problems, and in order to continue to survive [it] must be able to devise 
unconventional solutions” (cited in Merom, 1999: 417). 
 
The assumption of uniqueness in the dominant discourse, in turn, has helped 
to maintain threat perceptions. During the Lebanon War, for example, General 
Rafael Eitan, the chief of General Staff, rebuked journalists who questioned the 
image of Israel as a “Goliath” struggling against an Arab “David” (Merom, 1999: 
415). Disregarding the overwhelming Israeli military advantage, he argued, “the 
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truth is that it is the other way round…they [the Arabs] are Goliath” (cited in 
Merom, 1999: 415).4 
 
One implication of this search for complex military strategic solutions to 
Israel’s ‘unique’ security problems has been territorial expansion. Israeli geopolitical 
discourse has presented the continued occupation of the West Bank and the Golan 
Heights as a vital necessity in order to protect the survival of the state with reference 
to Israeli exceptionalism (Newman, 2002b: 311). Israel is presented as weak because 
it is under constant threat. Since it is structurally weak, it has to be militarily strong 
(Newman, 2002b: 311). This security identity and the geopolitical imagination, 
which it shapes, have instrumentalized the historical fact that the Jewish people have 
faced aggression in the past (Newman, 2002b: 311). Israeli geopolitical discourse 
has used this exceptionalism narrative to claim that Israel is excluded from the rest 
of the world—as if this is totally uncalled for. 
 
Yet, one question remains unasked: If Israel is an exceptional country faced 
with constant existential threat, what has made it possible for Israel to change its 
war/peace policies? In other words, if Israel’s exceptional geopolitical position and 
unique characteristics are ‘determinants’ of Israeli security policy, then what makes 
it possible for Israel to make peace? This is where a critical analysis of geopolitical 
discourse comes into the picture. Such an analysis looks at the discursive conditions 
of possibility for state action (Weldes and Saco 1996: 363; see also Barnett 1992, 
2002; Newman (2002a, 2002b).  
 
                                                 
4 The story of David and Goliath is an oft-cited one. It is the story of  Israelite David, a shepherd,  
who killed the giant Goliath with a sling shot and a stone.  
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Exceptionalism is not the only component of Israeli geopolitical discourse. 
But it is a significant component as it feeds the other two components, namely: 
‘Jewishness’ and ‘security’. The next two sections will look at these two 
components respectively.  
 
 
3.3 Jewishness: Israel as a Jewish State  
The Jewish people were called Israeli, about one thousand years, the sons or 
descendents of Israel, the people of Israel. One hears the expression “Jew” 
for the first time during the Babylonian exile after the destruction of the First 
Temple. The birthplace of the Jewish people is Israel: the land is called Eretz 
Yisrael, the land of Israel; the people are called Am Yisrael, the people of 
Israel. In asking ourselves what is the relationship between Jew and Israeli, 
the answer is that the Israeli is the total Jew, the whole Jew meaning the Jew 
who is leaving in a total, all-embracing Jewish reality, on Jewish land, where 
the diverse components of life (culture, economy, government etc.) are all 
Jewish (Yehoshua, 2002). 5 
 
David Newman argues that an Israeli as a citizen and Israel as a state have various 
competing identities and each of these identities reflects different geopolitical 
imaginations (Newman, 2002b: 307). Different national identity perceptions of 
various actors generate different geopolitical imaginations (Newman, 2002b: 314). 
As a consequence, Israel is located, “at one and the same time, in a number of 
diverse locations, not all of which are geographically contiguous” (Newman, 2002b: 
314). These different locations are the products of different geopolitical 
imaginations of different groups’ different identity perceptions.  
 
When considering geopolitical imaginations, Critical geopoliticians do not 
merely look at the physical/geographic location and size of the country but look at 
                                                 
5 Avraham Yehoshua is one of Israel’s famous writers/novelists. He is also a playwright and essayist.  
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the subjective interpretation of the space (Newman, 2002: 327). Different 
geopolitical imaginations stemming from different identity perceptions can only be 
understood “by reference to the discursive narratives of the different groups 
themselves and the extent to which they are redefined at local, regional and global 
levels” (Newman, 2002: 328). For example, Zionist identity has its origins in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Newman, 2002b: 315), so those Israel’s elites who identify 
themselves as Zionists “have always seen themselves as being part of the western 
world, with a highly technological, post-industrial economy and with a highly 
educated and literate workforce” (Newman, 2002b: 315). Also in terms of cultural 
aspirations, they locate themselves in Europe (Newman, 2002b: 318).  
 
The focus of this section of the chapter will be the identity perceptions of the 
political elites of Israel. In the name of the Israeli State, political elites have defined 
Israel as a Jewish and a Zionist state.6 This is in conformity with the legal and 
customary regulations in Israel. In Israel, Arabs do not serve in the armed forces, 
and in Israeli political culture, and it is not acceptable for a governing coalition to 
rely on the support of Arab political parties (Arian, 1995: 5). 
 
The term ‘Zionism’ was coined in the 1890s. It takes its name from Zion, the 
name of a hill in Jerusalem, which, after the capture of that city by the Israelites, 
became the royal residence of David and his successors. The fact that “Zionism, 
rather than Jewish nationalism, was chosen as the name of the national movement 
was itself an indication of the strong territorial focus on a particular piece of 
territory” (Newman, 2002b: 320). 
                                                 
6 In the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel is presented as such. In addition,  In 1995, 
the Knesset passed a law defining Israel as a state belonging to Jews.  
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 Throughout history, Zionism has “encouraged Jews to immigrate to the 
remembered Land of Israel as a form of collective survival” (Yiftachel, 2002: 224-
226). Zionism promotes the idea that two thousand years of Jewish history, which is 
marked with expulsion, exile and massacre has made it compulsory for Jews to 
found their own state (Slater, 1997: 675). A state “within which they could build 
normal lives, free from the murderous attacks that had periodically destroyed Jewish 
communities throughout Europe” (Slater, 1997: 675).  
 
Especially after the Holocaust, the ‘vital’ necessity for a Jewish state was 
confirmed among the Zionists. The land of Israel emerged as the best place for the 
establishment of Jewish people’s national homeland (Slater, 1997: 675). Once Israel 
was established, representations of Jewish history were used to provide a setting for 
the practices of territorial expansion (Yiftachel, 2002: 224). 
 
The country “was represented as an empty land awaiting its Jewish 
redemption after centuries of ‘neglect’“(Yiftachel, 2002: 224). Zionism used the 
well-known idiom: ‘a people without land to a land without people’ (Yiftachel, 
2002: 224). This strategy of denying the existence of the Arab population remains 
effective (Yiftachel, 2002: 224). Therefore, defining Israel as a state of its citizens 
(meaning that the citizens who are not Jewish will also share equal rights with Jews) 
is seen by the political elites “as a negation of the state formation process and as 
being anti-Zionist in its orientation” (Newman, 2002b: 308).  
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Zionism, as a part of a broader Jewish discourse, has been represented in 
different ways in order to facilitate or marginalize certain policies. For example, for 
some Zionists making peace with the Arab neighbors, which would mean territorial 
extraction, is an anti-Zionist act because of the strong territorial focus on a specific 
piece of territory, the land of Israel. Whereas for some, trying to control the 
occupied territories constitutes a betrayal to Zionism because it risks securing 
thefuture for Israel and the Jews (Newman, 2002b: 306). Mainly, Zionism works as 
a discourse that makes expansionist Jewish rule possible by the help of ‘survival’ 
and ‘security’ rhetoric incorporated in it. It is significant to note that it denies the 
“relevance of same ‘security’ and ‘survival’ considerations for the Palestinians” 
(cited in Yiftachel, 2002: 236). Violation of other people’s rights is normalized 
through a discourse of ‘normalcy’ while Jewish peoples’ rights are prioritized by a 
discourse of ‘exceptionalism’ (Yiftachel, 2002: 242-3). For instance, Yitzhak Shamir 
stated in the Knesset: 
This is our goal: territorial wholeness. It should not be encroached or 
fragmented. This is an a priori principle; it is beyond argument. You should 
not ask why. Why this land is ours requires no explanation. Is there any other 
nation that argues about its homeland, its size and dimensions, about 
territories, territorial compromise, or anything to that effect” (cited in 
Yiftachel, 2002: 234).  
 
Along with exceptionalism, Jewishness, as having a strong territorial focus and as a 
component of Israeli geopolitical discourse, provides a basis for another crucial 
component of Israeli geopolitical discourse: security.  
 
3.4 Security  
Security emerges as another important component of geopolitical discourse. It is 
interrelated both with ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘Jewishness’. The issue of the settlement 
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establishments illustrates this interrelationship well. Establishing the settlements “to 
extend territorial control and ownership has constituted one of the most discussed 
political geographical themes of the Arab-Israel conflict in general” (Newman, 
2002: 635). The motives of Jewish survival were used every time to justify new 
settlement projects in the name of enhancing national security (Yiftachel, 2002: 
231). The “geographical Judaisation program was premised on a hegemonic myth 
cultivated since the rise of Zionism and buttressed by the ‘nation-state’ myth that 
‘the land’ belongs to the Jews and to them only”. While doing this the land’s 
Palestinian past was marginalized (Yiftachel, 2002: 228). According to Yiftachel 
(2002: 239), this understanding was the reason behind the failure of the Camp David 
peace negotiations, which was an attempt to revive Oslo Peace Accords in 2000. The 
Israeli side presented their existence on the land as ‘natural’ and just, so transferring 
the territory to the Palestinians “was represented as ‘Israeli generosity’ (Yiftachel, 
2002: 239). In the Israeli discourse, the situation was presented as such that Israel 
had to ‘sacrifice’ some territory for the sake of peace (Yiftachel, 2002: 240).  
 
The establishment of settlements was made possible by the dominant 
geopolitical discourse by making use of the motives of religion and survival. These 
motives represented settlements as strengthening and ensuring Israel’s security. This 
representation in turn has helped to maintain the dominant geopolitical discourse 
because they enabled future claims to sovereignty over national territory (Newman, 
2002: 635-6). 
Imbued with political significance by governments, all boundaries are 
artificial and can be changed at will, through agreement or force. However, 
they remain essentially as human constructs even when they use natural 
features such as rivers or mountain ridges as convenient demarcation lines. 
However, once created, boundaries become almost mythical, inasmuch as 
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they determine the sovereign and inviolable limits of the state, not to be 
transgressed by external powers (Newman, 2002: 636). 
 
‘Exceptionalism’ and ‘Jewishness’ are elements of this third component of Israeli 
geopolitical discourse, which is ‘security’. Israel traditionally represents itself as 
alone and isolated (Newman, 2002b: 309). Israel also represents itself as isolated and 
excluded from the broader international community, for instance the United Nations 
“where vote after vote condemns the country for its continued occupation of the 
West Bank” (Newman, 2002b: 310). The 1975 vote, which defined Zionism as a 
kind of racism,7 further contributed to this perception of isolation. 
The policy implications of this self perceived isolation are that the country 
can only rely on itself, through a strong military posture, and that it must 
maintain an independent foreign policy without external intervention 
(including that of the USA) in its security decision-making (Newman, 2002b: 
310).  
 
In addition, the events such as the Intifada, or the Gulf War have strengthened this 
understanding (Newman, 2002b: 311-2). These events did not constitute a kind of 
threat that could “wipe Israel out of existence but reminded the Israeli people of the 
threat environment within which they live” (Newman, 2002b: 312). The small size 
of the country, demography, water geopolitics is often used in strengthening this 
security discourse (Newman, 2002b: 311-3).  
 
Israel’s national security objectives are usually expressed through negative 
slogans such as ‘never again’, referring to the Holocaust or “Masada shall not fall 
again”.8 Even this repetition of the word ‘again’ is a proof to the common belief that 
Jewish people have always lived under existential threats. This discourse affects 
people’s understanding of themselves in a way. It does so by representing Israel as a 
                                                 
7 This UN resolution was later rescinded.  
8 Masada is the name of the place (and the event) where the last Israelites in the Holy Land 
committed mass suicide in order not to surrender to the Roman Empire soldiers.  
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country, which should always be ready to fight and win wars because any failure 
would mean the termination of the Jews as a people ad as well as the end of Israeli 
state. This representation creates constant threat perceptions in Israel and enables 
offensive foreign policies. These exaggerated threat perceptions also promote the 
idea that politics should be subordinate to military affairs (Horowitz, 1992: 11-16). It 
also enables military-centric foreign and security policies. For example, Israel has 
excessively focused on Arab military capabilities and allowed a narrow margin for 
improving its relations with its neighbors in its foreign policy (Slater, 1997: 688).  
 
 The examples used so far have illustrated how geopolitical discourse was 
used for making conflictual and military-centric policies became possible. 
Geopolitical discourse has taken its bearing from the assumption of ‘geographical 
determinism’. Yet, although these components of geopolitical discourse have 
remained the same, peace became possible albeit for a brief moment between 1993 
and 2000. I will seek to illustrate how these components of Israeli geopolitical 
discourse made Oslo Peace Accords—a dramatic change in Israeli policy—possible.  
 
3.5 Oslo Peace Accords  
“For some, Israel’s unique identity is dependent on it remaining different and 
isolated from all other countries, while for others state normalcy within an 
international system can only be achieved by becoming part of that system” 
(Newman, 2002b: 307). For the Oslo Peace Accords case, ‘normalcy’ was chosen 
instead of exceptionalism in order to represent Israel as a member of the modern 
democratic Western world.  
 
 40
According to Michael Barnett (1999, 2002) the signing of the Oslo Accords 
would have not been possible if it had not been for some cultural preconditions 
present in the political elite’s discourse. Barnett claims that what allowed Israel to 
sign the 1993 Oslo Accords was Yitzhak Rabin’s successful framing of Israeli 
identity. Barnett (1999: 8-9; 2002) uses three key concepts in order to explain 
foreign policy change in Israel: identity, narratives and frames. What Barnett calls 
‘framing narratives upon a choice of particular identity’ is what has been referred to 
as ‘discourse’ so far in this study. Specific framing of the existing narratives and the 
corresponding identities in order to reach to some political ends matches with the 
definition of discourse adopted in the thesis. According to Barnett, Israel has four 
competing identities and each of them has different political implications: the 
religious identity, Israel as a Jewish state; the nationalist identity, Zionism; the 
Holocaust’s ‘legacy’; and the liberal, democratic identity, Israel as a part of the 
Western world (Barnett, 1999: 8-10). In the case of the Oslo Accords, for instance, 
the liberal Western identity came to the fore (Barnett, 1999: 10) and main 
assumption about the ‘determinacy’ of geography lost its effect. Barnett (1999: 14) 
describes narratives coming from the past as very important variables for political 
action: narratives of national identities are social constructs and can be reconstructed 
by actors according to their future policy orientations. Frames are some certain 
symbols and representations that are used in order to mobilize political action for a 
specific objective (Barnett, 1999: 15).  
 
Barnett maintains that in addition to these three concepts that explain the 
discursive dimension of the policy-making in Israel, there is a crucial institutional 
context, that of electoral, coalition and party politics, that has made the Oslo Peace 
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Accords possible. His argument supports the suggestion above that both discourse 
and material conditions matter. Israel’s proportional representative system does not 
allow a single party to gain majority. Small parties can also be elected to the 
parliament and as a result, governments are usually coalition governments. The 
politics of coalition formation and maintenance affects the policies of political 
parties and since different parties represent different dimensions of the national 
identity, policy options may vary.  
 
Barnett identifies four interrelated policy options for the political parties in 
Israel: maintaining Israel as a Jewish state; securing peace; maintaining Israel as a 
liberal democratic state; maintaining Greater Israel. In the Oslo Accords case, there 
was a preference of democracy and Zionism over Greater Israel, he says, but this 
was not a readily available option. It was Yitzhak Rabin and his Labor Party in 
coalition with the leftist Meretz and several small parties that created this possibility 
through the framing of cultural and symbolic assets. That is to say, they prioritized 
Israel’s Western identity over its Jewish identity. They prioritized Israel’s common 
history with the ‘democratic’ West over its ‘exceptional’ history as an isolated state. 
Components of the geopolitical discourse were reframed. Certainly, some brute facts 
like the end of the Cold War and the end of the ‘special relationship’ between the 
USA and Israel, the Gulf War and the changing Arab perception on Israel also 
helped them in altering the assumption that their history and geography determined 
their fate. However, without Rabin’s redefining and reframing the dominant 
narrative by emphasizing Israel’s secular and humanistic tradition and locating Israel 
in the West’s historical narrative of democracy, peace would not have become 
possible.   
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 Rabin and his political allies offered a narrative that visualized Israel’s future 
as a part of the international community. This was a break from the assumption of 
exceptionalism. Some intellectual and cultural movements, such as the ‘new 
historians’, who were questioning many ‘myths’ of Israel’s beginnings, also 
nourished this move towards a new narrative. Finally, Rabin and his allies framed 
their policies by saying that a peace process would enhance security and 
development because it would have allowed a reallocation of the budget from 
defense to social welfare and would have encouraged foreign direct investment and 
Israel’s integration to the world economy. ‘Security’ was defined in terms of 
economic welfare instead of being defined in terms of religious motives and 
‘survival’.  
 
Here, the concept of frame is crucial for understanding the adaptation of 
discursive assets to relevant foreign policy action. Framing may take place at both 
the elite and popular levels but even in a state such as Israel where the public is 
engaged in security issues more than many other countries, elite framing is 
particularly important for shifts in national security policy (Kaye, 2002: 563-4). The 
relationship between Israel’s national identity, historical narrative and specific frame 
on peace and security converged in her decision to recognize the Palestine 
Liberation Organization and sign the Declaration of Principle in 1993, in Oslo. This 
was the end of a decades-long conflict between Israel and PLO.  
 
There is a traditional argument of some Israeli political elites, which defend 
the creation of a Palestinian state because it is a necessary price for peace. Instead of 
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seeing it as a price to pay for peace, it was represented as a way of enhancing 
security in the Oslo Peace Accords case. The ‘security’ component of Israeli 
geopolitical discourse was reintroduced. Different elements of security were stressed 
and Oslo Peace Accords were made possible. In the dominant discourse, peace and 
security were being taken as alternatives to each other rather than being 
complementary elements enhancing each others’ capabilities. Rabin’s framing 
changed this understanding and enabled an alternative foreign policy option –the 
Oslo Peace Accords.9 ‘Peace with security’ discourse gave way to ‘peace is my 
security’ (Bilgin, 2004a: 28) discourse during this period. The case of Oslo Peace 
Accords is a case that illustrates how discourse matters.  
 
3.6 Conclusion  
Different ways of framing within the same geopolitical discourse can make 
seemingly impossible policies or actions possible. This can be taken as a proof that it 
is not merely geography that matters in the making of security and foreign policy but 
the (elements of) geopolitical discourse that matters. There are other examples in 
Israeli political history that represents how geopolitical discourse matters. Israel’s 
withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 is another such example. The Israeli 
state’s traditional discourse that “Israel had no choice but to occupy southern 
Lebanon in order to protect the north,” was reframed in a way, which maintained 
that, the “security zone has been an unnecessary cost to Israel since the north can be 
protected without it” (Kaye, 2002: 569-571). The framing of the ‘security’ element 
of the geopolitical discourse has changed and made the withdrawal possible.  
                                                 
9 In contradiction with this argument, Newman (2002b:313) maintains that the Oslo peace process 
paradoxically brought a decreased sense of security and reinforced the traditional security discourse 
because of the suicide bombings occurring after the accords (2002b:313). 
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 A similar example is the Jordan Valley, which was deemed very crucial for 
the Israeli security since it provided Israel with a defense from minor attacks and a 
better control of the West Bank. Yet, one day, Ehud Barak caught the Military by 
surprise when he declared that “Israel had no longer needed the Jordan Valley to 
ensure security in the region” (Leon, 2002). During the Camp David Summit of 
2000, Israel agreed to transfer some pieces of territories to the Palestinian Authority, 
which was previously seen as non-negotiable because of their strategic importance 
and security reasons (Newman, 2002: 639). The role of geopolitical discourse in 
making these actions possible was crucial.  
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CHAPTER IV 
HOW GEOPOLITICAL DISCOURSE MATTERS IN TURKEY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Geopolitical discourse is about specifying geographical reality in a way that makes 
certain practices possible for a state while rendering some others seemingly 
impossible. Geopoliticians were historically, “intellectuals of statecraft who 
emphasized the role of geographical constraints and opportunities on the conduct of 
foreign policy” (O Tuathail, Dalby and Routledge, 1998: 9). Thus, geopolitical 
discourse has always been a very crucial component of foreign and security policies 
of states. Turkey is no exception to those other countries where a number of 
geopolitical theorists and former practitioners write ‘how to’ books (Dalby, O 
Tuathail and Routledge, 1998: 8) about the security and foreign policy of the 
country. This also refers to the ‘advice to the prince’ nature of geopolitics, which 
makes geopolitics a ‘problem-solving’ and a pro-status quo field (Dalby, O Tuathail 
and Routledge, 1998: 8-9).  
 
In this chapter, geopolitical discourse of the political elites—of the 
intellectuals of statecraft and state officials—will be examined by looking at the 
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speeches delivered, and essays, books and articles written by them. Looking at the 
texts produced by military officials such as (retired) generals (Çakar, 1998; Başbuğ, 
2004; Büyükanıt, 2003; Ergüvenç, 1998; Erkaya, 1991; İlhan, 1989, 1999, 2003; 
Özbek, 2004; Torumtay 1991), state officials such as (retired) diplomats, advisers or 
foreign ministers (Cem, 1999, 2001; Ecevit,1999; Loğoğlu, 2000; Türkmen, 1998; 
Yılmaz, 1998, 2002) and some other influential figures such as academicians and 
journalists (Bağcı and Kardaş, 2003;  Davutoğlu, 2004; Köni, 2000, 2001; Tarakçı, 
2003). Most of these figures hold various positions thus have overlapping roles. For 
example, Davutoğlu is an academician but also a senior advisor to the prime-
minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Köni is an academician and works for the Center 
for Eurasian Strategic Studies Research (ASAM). He also lectures at the National 
Security Academy and the National Police Academy.  
 
By examining the texts produced by these ‘political elites’, the aim is to point 
to the conventional approach, to the dominant geopolitical discourse in Turkey, 
which represents geography as a given reality that cannot be changed and as the 
main determining factor of a country’s fate (Bilgin, 2003a: 210). As will be seen 
below these texts also reveal how different representations of the same geographical 
‘reality’ can change the so-called ‘unchangeable’ geographic factors.  
 
 This chapter will present the two main components of Turkish geopolitical 
discourse, namely: ‘geographical determinism’ and ‘Westernness/Europeanness’. 
Geographical determinism is a component of geopolitical discourse almost 
everywhere in the world and in Turkey it appears as the most important component. 
After outlining these two components, the next step will be using that of the case of 
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Turkey-EU relations in order to illustrate how these components shape policies. The 
core of the argument here is that in the dominant Turkish geopolitical discourse 
Turkey’s membership to the European Union is presented as the only ‘viable’ 
foreign policy option. Yet, there are some key figures that frame the components of 
geopolitical discourse in different ways and suggest alternative ways for action as 
well (see İlhan, 2002, 2003). This helps to show that same geography can be 
represented in different ways using the same components of the geopolitical 
discourse and enable different policy outcomes. This, in turn, would invalidate the 
assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ which is the key component of 
geopolitical discourse.  
 
4.2 Geographical Determinism in Turkish Geopolitical Discourse  
Bilgin (2003: 210) identifies ‘geographical determinism’ as one of the central 
elements of Turkish security culture. Geographical determinism refers to the 
assumed determining power of the geography on politics (especially security and 
foreign policies). Bilgin (2003a: 210) argues that Turkey’s geographical location is 
used as a means of framing security and foreign polices by the political elites. The 
following ideas of the political elites further substantiate this point.  
İlter Türkmen (1998: 3) quotes Napoleon in a conference presentation: 
“being acquainted with the geography of a country is being acquainted with its 
foreign policy”. Türkmen says that for centuries political geography has been a key 
element of a country’s international relations. He states that the fate of the Ottoman 
Empire was largely determined by its geographical location and also today the 
challenges Turkey faces and the opportunities it has are because of its geopolitical 
 48
location (Türkmen, 1998:2). Köni also argues that the most important factor 
affecting foreign policy decisions is the geographical location (Köni, 2001: 80). 
Ahmet Davutoğlu (2004: 17, 46) shares the same line of thinking by defining 
geography as one of the constant elements of foreign policy making. 
 
 Suat İlhan is a key figure in the field of geopolitics in Turkey. He is a retired 
general of Turkish Armed Forces; his books (1989, 1999) are used as textbooks in 
military schools and he also taught in military academies. His writings reveal how 
the assumption of ‘geographical determinism’ lies at the heart of Turkish 
geopolitical discourse. Consider this quote from a key text, Geopolitical Sensitivity, 
which is used as a textbook in the military academy:  
Turkey is the hinge on the world’s biggest land piece composed of Asia, 
Europe and Africa, the world island in geopolitical terms. Turkey is both the 
lock and the key to this hinge. Turkey’s geography has always effectively 
played its role as the lock and the key because for a long while it was the 
world island that was known as the only land piece on earth.  All of the 
fundamental civilizations and religions renowned so far developed around 
the intersection point of these three continents because of its geographical 
location (İlhan, 1989: 56; 2003:34).  
 
İlhan’s strong attachment to the assumption of geographical determinism can be 
seen in his words. Deputy Chief of the Head of the General Staff also confirms the 
occurrence of such an assumption of ‘geographical determinism’: “If we look at the 
history of Anatolian geography, on which Turkey is situated, we can conclude that 
on this geography only strong states could survive, and the weak ones were wiped 
out of history” (Başbuğ, 2004). His argument acknowledges the determining role of 
geography on the fate of the states and at the same time sets a legitimate basis for 
Turkey’s quest for power. The same argument is shared by Nejat Tarakçı. He 
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maintains that “weak societies have no chance to survive in Turkey’s geography” 
(Tarakçı: 2003: 146).  
The assumption of geopolitical determinism has important policy 
implications. In Turkish political elite’s discourse, Turkey’s geography is 
represented as pre-given and unchangeable. Yet this understanding is groundless 
when the same geography is represented/framed differently in order to explain 
different policies (Bilgin, 2003a: 209). An example in this respect can be found in 
what happened after the Johnson Letter. This letter from the then president of the 
USA, Lyndon Johnson was warning that Turkey in case of a Turkish intervention to 
Cyprus, if Turkey is faced with Soviet threat, NATO could not have been willing to 
defend Turkey. This was leaving Turkey out of the Cold War Western Alliance. 
İsmet İnönü who was Turkey’s president at that time, replied to this ‘warning’ by 
saying: “Then another world will be established and Turkey will take its place in it”. 
His words were simply telling that Turkey was not bound with allying itself with the 
USA and it had other options.  
Moreover, the same geographical location is framed in different ways 
enabling both active and passive foreign policies. An active policy is supported by a 
discourse of ‘Turkey’s strategic importance’ (and its role as an important strategic 
actor) is represented as determined by its geographical location; whereas a passive 
policy option is explained by ‘Turkey’s geographic vulnerabilities’, again, 
represented as determined by its geographical location (Bilgin, 2003a: 210). For 
example, Turkey’s passive attitude concerning the democratization process during 
the 1990s was sought to be legitimized by designating democratization as a process 
that should be slowed down due to Turkey’s vulnerable geographical location 
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(Bilgin, 2003a: 209). A similar argument can be found in Murat Belge (1993: 241). 
He states that there has always been a geopolitical discourse in Turkey, which has 
been used by statespersons in order to legitimize Turkey’s political regime. The 
geographical location we live in is shown as the cause of the political regime in 
Turkey. Belge quotes a person who presents himself as a ‘colonel’: “In a country 
like Austria, socialism can be an alternative but with the geopolitical location 
Turkey has, it is impossible” because Turkey is surrounded by severe enemies 
(Belge, 1993: 241). When ‘the colonel’ made this comment it was 1972. Belge wrote 
in 1993 that the situation got worse because of the events in the Balkans, the Kurdish 
problem, and the worsening of the situation in the Middle East. So if the same man 
was here to speak, he was likely to say “In a country like Austria, democracy is an 
alternative but with the geographical location Turkey has, it is impossible” (Belge, 
1993: 242). This point is well supported with the remarks of the ex- prime minister 
of Turkey, Bülent Ecevit, who said: “Turkey’s geography requires a special type of 
democracy” (cited in Bilgin, 2003a: 209).  
Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East is another example that helps 
to show the invalidity of the idea of ‘geographical determinism’. Turkish foreign 
policy towards the West has almost always been prior to its foreign policy towards 
the Middle East. Moreover, “Turkish foreign policy towards the Middle East has 
always been considered an extension of the Western-oriented Turkish foreign 
policy” (Criss and Bilgin, 1997). Yet, during the 1960s, problems in the relations 
with the West, particularly with the USA, helped for the generation of an active and 
multi-dimensional foreign policy understanding in Turkey. Concerning the issues 
such as Cyprus and use of air bases in its territory, Turkey could not come into terms 
with its Western allies. This lent a hand to the making of an active foreign policy 
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towards the Middle East. For instance, in 1964, Turkey took the initiative to create 
the organization of Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) with Iran and 
Pakistan (Criss and Bilgin, 1997). Turkey’s active foreign policy towards the Middle 
East during the 1960s helps to show that it is possible for Turkey to make alternative 
foreign policy choices. It helps to show that its foreign policy options are not 
determined and dictated by its geographical location.  
Geographical determinism is not the only component of Turkish geopolitical 
discourse. ‘Westernness/Europeanness’ is another crucial component in the making 
of Turkish geopolitics. Next section will outline the premises of this component.  
 
4.3 Westernness/ Europeanness in Turkish Geopolitical Discourse 
There is a mutually constitutive relationship between geographical representations, 
geopolitical discourse and the foreign and security policy discourse and practices 
(Bilgin 2003, 2004a, 2004b). This means that representing geography in a specific 
way is also describing and enabling the possible foreign policy actions for this 
geography. In turn, these foreign policy actions form a basis for representing the 
same geography. Geopolitical discourse “is not simply a separate activity or rather 
identification of specific geographical influences upon a particular foreign-policy 
action” (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 48). Usage of words such as ‘foreign’ or 
‘West’ constitute an important element of geopolitical discourse as well, because 
these words call upon certain understandings, narratives, meanings in our minds. 
When somebody uses these words, those invoked understandings and meanings will 
inevitably be associated with certain policy options (Agnew and Corbridge, 1995: 
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48). For example, the word ‘West’ is largely associated with prosperity, welfare, 
peace and democracy.  
 
Turkey’s Westernization process was set by Atatürk and adopted by political 
elites firmly since 1920s. In conformity with this Westernization process, 
membership to NATO and EU has always been a crucial element of Turkish foreign 
policy. As a retired diplomat states anybody who has worked for the Turkish 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs during their careers had at least once became a part of 
the integration with the West debate (Tezok, 2002: 7).  
 
Representations of history is an important component of Turkey’s claim for 
Westernness. Political elites make use of this component in every opportunity. For 
example, Ambassador Loğoğlu (2000) maintains that  
 Turkey has shared Europea's geography, and although it was sometimes on 
the opposite side, Europe's history. Since the first political reforms have been 
made in the Ottomon Empire, Turkey took its place in the European 
integration movement. It was crowned with the new Republican regime in its 
quest to reach the level of modern civilizations. The Turkish Republic since 
its foundation until now has seen modernization as its main principal and 
participated in European institutions that symbolized this modernization.  
 
Ex-minister İsmail Cem (1999) concluded that: “Turkey has been European for 
seven centuries. We do not feel the need for registering this with any countries or 
institutions”.  
 
Another important premise of Turkey’s political elites’ claim to being 
European comes from the role Turkey played in NATO during the Cold War (Bilgin, 
2004b: 12). After the 1997 Luxembourg Summit, which did not declare Turkey as a 
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candidate for membership to the EU, this line of thinking was expressed by general 
(Ret.) Nezihi Çakar10:  
 
The Luxembourg Summit in 1997 erroneously did not include Turkey […] 
After making great sacrifices in fulfilling its responsibilities within NATO 
for the security of the Western community for more than 45 years, Turkey 
does not want further delays of its membership nor can it wait behind other 
candidates, the bulk of which cannot compete with Turkey. It is highly 
irrational to accept former Warsaw Pact adversaries as candidates to become 
full EU members and exclude Turkey, a staunch NATO ally. Turkey’s 
exclusion from the political and economic integration of the EU is unjustified 
and in no way constitutes a healthy condition, not for Turkey nor for other 
Western countries (Çakar, 1998).  
 
After the Luxembourg Summit, politicians and diplomats were asking themselves 
had Turkey been invaded by the Soviet Union and had become a member of a 
Warsaw pact during the Cold War, would it have been considered as a candidate for 
membership to the EU, like Poland or Hungary (Yetkin, 2002: 14). This thinking 
reveals the ‘resentment’ (Bilgin, 2004b: 17) of Turkish policy-makers. They believe 
that since Turkey was a firm ally of the West during the Cold War, it deserved to be 
accepted as a candidate. Resentment can also be found in Çakar’s words:  
Turkey’s commitment to the European ideal has always been put forward 
clearly and decisively. Turkey’s views and expectations for a united and 
democratic Europe have been expressed to our European friends on every 
occasion. It was stated that Turkey served as a bulwark for democratic values 
in this critical part of the world, and struggled resolutely to defend them 
when they were threatened. Today Turkey is a bridge conveying these values 
to new geopolitical regions. However, the decisions taken at the Luxembourg 
Summit indicate some leaders of the EU member states have unfortunately 
not understood Turkey’s rightful concerns and expectations (Çakar, 1998). 
 
Turkey’s Westernness is always prioritized in its foreign policy agenda. Even the 
discourse on Turkey’s diverse geopolitical imaginations and positionings are used to 
support its ‘Westernness’. Consider this quote from Mesut Yılmaz (2003):  
                                                 
10 He was then Senior Advisor to the President of Turkey. 
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Turkey's one half is European. It shares European values and is working on 
institutionalizing these values. But with it's other half it is the representative 
of alternative cultures and civilizations to Europe. It is Central Asian, Middle 
Eastern, Caucasian, Islamic (Yılmaz, 2003). 
 
In Yılmaz’s words, Turkey’s one half is reserved for its Europeanness while four 
other alternatives (being Central Asian, Middle Eastern, Caucasian and Islamic) 
have to share the other half. His words present Turkey’s alternative identities as a 
complementing Turkey’s Europeanness.  
 
Turkey’s diverse geopolitical imaginations can be found in the statements 
made in the web site of the Ministry of National Defense: “Turkey, which has a very 
important geostrategic location, connects three continents to each other, is at the 
same time a European, Asian, Balkan, Caucasian, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean 
and Black Sea country”; and also in the statements in the web site of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs:  
She lies at a strategic crossroads where two continents, Europe and Asia 
meet, and also where cultures and civilizations come together. This unique 
position gives her European, Balkan, Mediterranean, Middle Eastern, 
Caucasian and Asian identities all at the same time.11 
 
However, these diverse imaginations are used to reinforce Turkey’s Western identity 
instead of generating diverse foreign policy options and are represented as an asset 
enhancing Turkey’s value for its Western allies, such as the EU (Bilgin, 2004b: 15-
16). Because “Turkish policy makers’ ‘preferred geopolitical location’ for Turkey” 
is a “Turkey in Europe” (Bilgin, 2004b: 8). As Türkmen (1998: 5) maintains: “There 
is no other regional community with which Turkey can naturally join, considering its 
intensity of bilateral relations, its geographical location and its historical progress”. 
                                                 
11 <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm> accessed on 21.06.2004.  
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While defining membership to European Union not a barrier to Turkey’s active role 
in other Middle Eastern, or Black Sea or Central Asian organizations, Türkmen 
(1998: 5) at the same time emphasizes that none of these organizations can be an 
alternative to Europe. Former foreign minister İsmail Cem was also among the ones 
whose preferred geographical location for Turkey is the West:  
[t]he post-Cold War political framework witnessed the appearance or the 
confirmation of several independent states. Out of the multitude of those 
“new” states, almost all -in the Balkans, in the Caucasus or in Central Asia- 
are those with whom Turkey shares a common history or a common language 
and cultural affinity. This provides Turkey with a new international 
environment of historical, political and economic dimensions. Turkey thus 
becomes a “center” for the emerging Eurasian reality and constitutes Western 
Europe’s major historical, cultural and economic opening to Eastern horizons 
(Cem, 2001).  
Here he presents Turkey’s diverse positioning as a contribution to its positioning in 
the West. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar Büyükanıt 
(2003) also maintains, “Turkey when it becomes a full member to the European 
Union will contribute to the geostrategic depth of the union and to the enrichment of 
the union in cultural terms”. In Yılmaz’s words, the two components of Turkish 
geopolitical discourse, ‘geographic determinism’ and ‘Westernness/Europeanness” 
merges into one another.  
We believe that Turkey is European as much as it is Middle Eastern, 
Caucasian, Balkanian and Asian, maybe it is more like European. Turkey's 
being European is a certain judgement of history and geography and we do 
not need any confirmation from our European friends to accept this fact 
(Yılmaz , 1998).  
 
It is significant to note that this prioritization of Westernness in the political 
discourse has also constrained Turkish foreign policy in many ways. For, active 
foreign policy towards the Middle East or regions different than the West became 
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possible only when Turkey felt excluded from the West. For example, after the 1964 
Johnson Letter or 1997 Luxembourg Summit.12  
 
Tarakçı (2003), Davutoğlu (2004), İlhan (2003) have all argued that Turkey’s 
prioritization of Westernness and prioritization of membership to the European 
Union have constrained its policies towards The Middle East and the Central Asia. 
İlhan (2003) maintains that without being a member to the European Union, Turkey 
would be freer in order to pursuit its national interests in the other regions of the 
world. Davutoğlu(2004) and Tarakçı (2003) identify many alternatives to Turkey’s 
membership to the European Union. Studying these alternatives is beyond the scope 
of this study. But it should be noted that, whether they support Turkey’s membership 
to the European Union or not, these writers acknowledge Turkey’s Western identity, 
but they do not prioritize it over other alternatives. İlhan furthers his claims that 
"Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe. But both sides are not aware 
of this fact yet" (İlhan, 2003: 114).   
 
 
4.4 Turkey and EU in Geopolitical Perspective  
 
In the dominant geopolitical discourse, the main components of Turkish geopolitical 
discourse, which are ‘geographical determinism’ and ‘Westernness’, are framed in 
such a way that Turkey’s membership to the European Union is represented as the 
only foreign policy option. This section will try to illustrate how this framing works 
by looking at ‘how to’ books, articles and speeches in Turkey (see for example 
Davutoğlu, 2001; İlhan, 1989, 1999, 2002, 2003; Özbek, 2004; Tarakçı, 2003) point 
                                                 
12 European enlargement left Turkey out .Turkey was not declared as a candidate for membership to 
the European Union.  
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to the key issue with which geopolitical discourse is concerned with in Turkey. This 
key issue is Turkey’s Western identity and Turkey’s alliances with the West, namely 
NATO and the EU memberships. Both NATO and EU, either implicitly or 
explicitly, are taken as geopolitical entities in these books. According to Suat İlhan 
(1989: 119, 124; 1999: 13-14; 2003: 25) both NATO and European Union are 
geopolitical events: 
European Union is not merely an economic event. EU should be examined 
from a geopolitical perspective. The political, social and even military 
consequences of the integration process initiated by Europe can be observed. 
These events are based on geographic platform and their immense affects are 
geopolitical […] NATO is also a geopolitical event (İlhan, 1999: 13). 
 
İlhan also states that Turkey’s geographical location is the determining factor of its 
memberships in important alliances such as NATO (İlhan, 1989: 119) and the 
European Union. It is argued that since Turkey’s unique geography constitutes 
crucial cultural, economic and strategic assets, it is difficult to exclude Turkey from 
such alliances (Tarakçı, 2003: 141-6, 153-4). 
 
Turkey’s membership to the European Union is described as a “geopolitical 
and geostrategic obligation” and a necessity of Turkey’s Westernization—a target 
set by Atatürk—by the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Turkish General Staff Yaşar 
Büyükanıt (2003). Geopolitical discourse in Turkey presents Turkey’s 
Westernness/Europeanness (both in terms of membership to the EU and in terms of 
geography) as a geopolitical necessity as well as presenting Turkey’s geographical 
position as a necessity for Europe (Bilgin, 2003b: 346):  
The importance of anchoring Turkey to the West and incorporating the future 
of an undivided European continent with the strong presence of a geo-
political and geo-strategic crossroads between the East and West is self-
explanatory. Turkey definitely belongs to Europe (Çakar, 1998).  
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 The Cold War years witnessed Turkish policy makers’ eager participation “in 
European institutions, membership in which was viewed as evidence of Turkey’s 
claim to belong to the Western civilization” (Bilgin, 2004b: 10). In the geopolitical 
discourse, Turkey was represented as a country whose geostrategic importance was 
crucial to the Western bloc. The common belief, “they cannot ignore us […] because 
we are strategically important” (Bağcı and Kardaş, 2003) was strong during the Cold 
War. However, after the Cold War, the political elites’ opinions on Turkey’s 
strategic importance changed along with the opinion of the EU. As Türkmen 
maintains, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and with the disappearance of the 
Soviet threat, Turkey lost its strategic importance for Europe (Türkmen, 1998: 4). 
Köni makes a similar argument (see also Bilgin, 2004b) by stating that: 
[r]egardless of its essential contribution to dealing with security threats in 
Iraq and the Balkans, Turkey was viewed only in the context of its former 
role on the periphery of the Soviet Union, and was thus marginalized by the 
West at the beginning of the post-Cold War era (Köni, 2000). 
 
Turkey has been located on the same piece of land since 1923 but the meanings 
attached to this location have varied over time. The same geography has been 
represented in different ways: positive and negative (Bilgin, 2004b: 15). In positive 
terms, it provides exceptional opportunities such as being a bridge between Europe 
and Asia, and representing a rich cultural mosaic. For example, the following 
argument chooses to emphasize Turkey’s geostrategic strength:  
[T]urkey has been an important country because of its geographic location 
between Europe, the Middle East and Asia, which gives it easy access to 
strategically important regions and major energy resources. Moreover, thanks 
to its character as a modern Muslim country, culturally, Turkey stands as a 
bridge between Western and Islamic civilizations. The conventional 
importance attributed to Turkey’s strategic value became more visible 
following the events of September 11 (Bağcı and Kardaş, 2003). 
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Bülent Ecevit (1999), ex-prime minister of Turkey, was among those who chose to 
stress the positive sides of Turkey’s geographic location:  
Bosphorus Bridge does not only connect two sides of İstanbul, it also 
connects Europe and Asia... Not only in geographical sense but also in 
political and cultural sense...Turks have been European almost for six 
centuries... But they are not only European, they are also Asian, Caucasian 
and Middle Eastern ...Turkey is not only a bridge between Europe and Asia 
but also a bridge between Christianity, Judaism and Islam. 
 
Ecevit’s words incorporate the component of ‘Westernness/ Europeanness’ in the 
geopolitical discourse that frames Turkey’s geographic location as an asset for its 
foreign policy. Still, Turkey as a bridge between different cultures and countries can 
be represented as generating vulnerabilities:  
Turkey’s geographical location makes it a border state. Anatolia is Asia’s 
European border and Thrace is Europe’s Asian border. We live in the borders 
between Islam and Christianity […], eastern and western cultures, liberal and 
statist economies. It is difficult to be a border country. It requires very strong 
economic, social, political and military structures (İlhan, 2003: 35).  
 
This line of thinking is shared and formulated by Tarakçı (2003: 146) as well. This 
thinking promotes the idea that Turkey’s military should be strong in order to be 
able to deal with the difficulties posed by its geographical location. As stated by a 
retired general: “The sensitive geopolitical situation of the country will compel it to 
maintain a sound defense posture“(Erkaya, 1991: 34). General (Ret.) Ergüvenç 
makes a similar remark:  
Such [Turkey’s] geography might be considered a privilege were it not to 
create a reciprocal sensitivity which in turn necessitates vigilance and obliges 
Turkey to keep a strong defence. This is to say that, from a different aspect, 
Turkey is seen squeezed on the margins of several regions. Commensurably, 
in some way, Turkey is surrounded by differences. There are 13 countries 
around Turkey, with 11 different ethnic nationalities, each with a different 
historical experience and aspiration, speaking ten different languages and 
practising six different religions. At the same time, chronic trouble spots, 
instabilities, weak democracies and totalitarian regimes encircle Turkey 
(Ergüvenç, 1998).  
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Its geopolitical position renders Turkey both strong and vulnerable according to 
these texts. Turkey’s vulnerability can come to the fore while framing passive 
policies and Turkey’s geostrategic strength can be prevailing in the discourse while 
pursuing active polices.  
 
Also, Turkey’s ability to cope with these geopolitical vulnerabilities is 
represented as its geopolitical strengths. An example of this kind of a representation 
can be found in the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs:13 “’Peace at home, 
peace in the world’ [policy doctrine that was formulated by Atatürk] has not been an 
easy task given the history and geographical location of Turkey”. Here, Turkey’s 
geographical location is represented as being in a turbulent neigbourhood. But, 
Turkey is represented as a strong country that can turn its geopolitical disadvantages 
into advantages. Another example:  
Turkey lives in a geography, which is as extensive as its problems, conflicts 
and instabilities. However, Turkey has demonstrated success in preserving 
the attribute of being an island of peace and stability in such a region. Turkey 
is one of the rare democracies located in vast geography extending from 
Europe to the Pacific Ocean and to the Middle East.14 
 
Turkish state is again represented as a strong state that has succeeded in overcoming 
the vulnerabilities posed by its geography. It is also represented as not belonging to 
the turbulent neighborhood in which it is situated. The word ‘island’ is used in order 
to distinct Turkey as a peaceful country among a bunch of violent ‘others’.  
 
 In conclusion, Turkish political elites have represented Turkey as a country, 
which has specific strengths and vulnerabilities due to its geographical location. In 
                                                 
13 See <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/grupg/gb/default.htm> accessed on 21.06.2004.  
14  See< http://www.msb.gov.tr/Birimler/GnPPD/pdf/p1c2.pdf> accessed on 13.05.2003. 
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the case of Turkey-EU relations, both these strengths and vulnerabilities are used to 
support Turkey’s membership to the European Union.  
 
4.5 Conclusion  
Geographical determinism and Westernness are key components of Turkish 
geopolitical discourse. In the dominant discourse, the geographical location of 
Turkey is represented using these two components. The case of Turkey-EU relations 
is used in this chapter to illustrate how these two components operates through the 
geopolitical discourse and prioritizes Turkey’s membership to the European Union 
as a foreign policy action while at the same time shaping domestic politics towards 
‘cautious’ democratization.  
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION  
 
 
“[S]ometimes places are bombed and sometimes they are demonized” (Dodds, 2001: 
475). Geopolitical discourse matters in understanding how. Studying geopolitical 
discourse helps to see “how the Earth was made into the World“(Agnew, 1998: 7) 
because it enables us to see that we attach certain meanings to geographies. 
Geographies are things that are imbued with meanings that are attached to them. 
These meanings create broader geographical imaginations and representations and 
make a difference in policy-making (as it does in every sphere of life). As Weldes 
and Saco put it:  
A discursive approach opens up an additional set of questions, about the 
discursive conditions of possibility enabling particular state actions, which 
are also of importance in the attempt to understand international politics. For 
this reason, discursive analyses should be added to the stock of tools 
deployed for the study of international relations and foreign policy (Weldes 
and Saco, 1996: 395). 
 
“Once geopolitics is recognized as operating as a discourse, as a scripting of the 
world”, as a source of power and practical knowledge, then it is open for 
contextualization, deconstruction and reconstruction (Sidaway, 2000: 118). This 
reconstruction would allow for an explicitly normative choice in the making of 
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foreign policy. It will allow for peace in the Israeli case and it will further 
democratization in Turkey.  
 
Geopolitical knowledge as provided in textbooks, or ‘how to’ books operates 
as a discourse shaping policy makers’, intellectuals’ and other people’s minds. This 
thesis has tried to show, by looking at Israel and Turkey examples, that geopolitical 
discourse matters. It matters because it makes some imaginations and 
representations of the world available to us while marginalizing some other 
imaginations and representations. This, in turn makes some policy actions possible 
while marginalizing some others. This study tried to show “how certain geopolitical 
understandings about geographical representations serve to underwrite specific 
‘policies’ and ‘practices’” (Agnew, 1998: 3). 
 
In Chapter II, the main arguments of the theoretical perspective of this study, 
the arguments of Critical Geopolitics approach was outlined. Critical Geopolitics 
seeks to understand “how global space is incessantly reimagined and rewritten by 
centers of power and authority” (O Tuathail, 1996: 249). O Tuathail defines this 
power of reimagining and rewriting as ‘geo-power’. Dominant representations and 
practices making the modern geopolitical imagination have been mainly “those of 
the political elites of the Great Powers, those states and empires most capable of 
imposing themselves and their views on the rest of the world” (Agnew, 1998: 6). 
Accordingly, the main geopolitical ideas adopted by Turkish and Israeli elites have 
been those that were developed by European/American males from upper and 
middle class (Agnew et al., 2003: 4). An account of these central geopolitical ideas 
is made at the end of Chapter II as well. These ideas have guided the thesis trying to 
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understand how geopolitical discourse matters in Israeli and Turkish geopolitics. For 
example, the main line of thinking in Israeli and Turkish geopolitics is based upon 
the traditional geopolitical thought that sees geography as the main determining 
factor on a country’s fate.  
 
Chapter III and Chapter IV were designed as illustrations of how geopolitical 
discourse matters. These chapters laid out the components of geopolitical discourse 
in each country before turning to look at how geopolitical discourse matters. As 
discussed earlier, Critical Geopolitics argues that political elites are ‘knowledge-
bearing groups’ and work in ‘knowledge-generating institutions’. Therefore, in both 
chapters, the geopolitical discourses of political elites were examined. In Chapter III, 
the main components of Israeli geopolitical discourse were examined. These were 
‘exceptionalism’, ‘Jewishness’ and ‘security’. These are interrelated components 
since ‘Jewishness’ constitutes a basis for ‘exceptionalism’ and ‘security’, and also 
‘exceptionalism’ constitutes a basis for ‘security’.  ‘Exceptionalism’ refers to the 
idea that Jewish peoples’ history and religion makes Israel an exceptional state. 
‘Jewishness’ refers to the strong nationalist and religious discourse in Israeli 
geopolitics. ‘Security’ refers to the ‘existential threat’ perceptions of Israel. The 
example of Oslo Peace Accords was used to illustrate how these various components 
have worked to make peace possible. Until the Oslo Peace Accords, the same 
components were being used in order to explain the impossibility of peace, but 
different prioritizations and reframing of those components made peace possible in 
Oslo.  
 
 65
In Chapter IV, Turkish geopolitical discourse and its major components were 
outlined and the example of Turkey’s membership to European Union is discussed 
in order to show how geopolitical discourse shapes Turkey’s foreign policy. The 
major components of Turkish geopolitical discourse are ‘geographical determinism’ 
and ‘Westernness’. ‘Geographical determinism’ refers to assumed determining role 
of Turkey’s geographical location on its foreign politics. ‘Westernness’ refers to the 
prioritization of Turkey’s Western identity in Turkish geopolitical discourse. The 
example of Turkey-EU relations was used in order to show how these two 
components of geopolitical discourse operate in the making of Turkish security and 
foreign policy. The dominant geopolitical discourse in Turkey presents Turkey’s 
foreign policy towards Europe and the West as the only option.   
 
Given the limits of time and limits of sources available on this subject matter, 
my findings in this study are limited. A study on the relationships between material 
factors and geopolitical discourse would further develop this thesis. It would help to 
answer the question to what extent discourse matters and to what extent material 
factors matter. For Critical Geopolitics, as well as the analysis of textual production, 
the analysis of material contexts and practices within which these textual 
productions emerge and become meaningful is crucial (cited in Hakli, 1998: 336). 
The term discourse covers “the weaving together of thought and action, text and 
practice, image and interest, truth and power” (Hakli, 1998: 337). Newman suggests 
another dimension of the relationship between the material factors and geopolitical 
discourse:  
As geographical realities change, they feed into the next stage of decision 
making as facts that cannot be ignored by the negotiators, regardless of how 
long they have been part of the landscape or whether their initial formation 
was justified on moral or legal grounds (Newman, 2002: 631). 
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 A study about the alternative geopolitical discourses existing in Israel and Turkey 
would also improve the arguments of this study. There are some academic works on 
Israel’s competing identities and how these identities produce alternative 
geopolitical imaginations and discourses (and in turn are reproduced by these 
discourses), but I was not able to find one about Turkey. This kind of a study would 
be a lot stronger in order to show how the dominant geopolitical discourses limit our 
understanding of the world. But such a work would require an extensive study on 
different groups in the society that represent and promote these alternative identities 
and geopolitical discourses. As formulated by Critical geopoliticians, critical 
analysis must also pay close attention to the unequal relations of power between 
dominant elite discourses and the geographies produced and made meaningful in 
everyday social life (see also Dalby, 1991, 1993; Dodds and Sidaway, 1994). As 
Hakli maintains, popular geographies can be just as ‘geopolitical’ as are their 
institutionally produced counterparts (Hakli, 1998: 338). 
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